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Abstract 
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a wireless communication system of continuously self-configuring and infrastructure-
less network of mobile devices which can move independently in any direction at any time.Routing protocols is required for 
message exchange in MANET. The most widely used routing protocol is OLSR (Optimized Link State Routing Protocol). It is 
efficient in bandwidth utilization and path calculation. But it is vulnerable to many types of attacks. In this paper, we discuss about 
various methods used to prevent a type of Denial of Service (DoS) attack called the node isolation attack that is capable to 
compromise OLSR protocol. 
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1. Introduction 
Usage of mobile devices is tremendously increasing in the present world. Many networks use mobile devices for 
data exchange. A Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) is a collection of mobile nodes interconnected by wireless links 
without the aid of any fixed infrastructure or centralized access point such as a base station [1]. MANET is a network 
that contains a group of mobile devices which exchanges data. Mobile devices are the nodes in MANET. There is no 
central authority to control the MANET. No predefined infrastructure is defined for MANET. The nodes in MANET 
exchange messages through intermediate nodes. Each node in a MANET is free to move independently in any 
direction at any time. The nodes can join and leave the MANET as they wish. Therefore the communication links 
between the nodes changes frequently. Each node will act as a router because they deal with the forwarding of data of 
all other nodes in the network. Each device must continuously maintain the information required to properly route 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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traffic. The network may contain multiple numbers of transceivers in between the nodes. This results in a highly 
dynamic and autonomous topology.Routing protocols is required for message exchange in MANET. 
 
There are two wide categorization of routing algorithms used for packet transmission in the network. They are 
Reactive Protocol and Proactive Protocol. Reactive protocol finds route for message transmission on demand. AODV 
and DSR are reactive protocols [2]. Proactive protocol is table driven. It maintains a routing table that contains the 
destinations in the network and the optimal path to the destination. OLSR, DSDV and OSPF are proactive protocols 
[2]. 
1.1. OLSR Protocol 
The main requirement of MANET is that all the nodes in the network must recognize each other even in motion. 
The most widely used routing protocol is OLSR (Optimized Link State Routing Protocol). It is efficient in bandwidth 
utilization and path calculation. It is a type of proactive protocol. OLSR is the optimization of the classical Link State 
Protocol [3]. It is used to reduce network overhead. Classical Link State Protocol propagates messages by flooding it 
in the network [3]. This lead to the duplication of messages in the network and thus network overhead is created. In 
OLSR the duplication and overhead is reduced by selective transmission of data. Introducing a concept called Multi 
Point Relays (MPR) the selective transmission is achieved by OLSR. The idea of MPR is to minimize the flooding of 
broadcast packets in the network by reducing duplicate retransmissions in the same region [3]. MPRs are the subset 
of 1-hop neighbours of a node. OLSR achieves optimization by appointing minimum number of MPRs for a node. 
MPRs are the forwarding agents for control packets throughout the network. A node will select an MPR only if it 
covers all the 2-hop neighbours of the node. 
 
Two types of messages are used in OLSR to discover the network topology. They are: 
 
x HELLO message 
x TC (Topology Control) message 
 
HELLO message will declare a node’s knowledge about its surroundings. It list out the 1-hop neighbours of the 
node. It is broadcasted in the network. The nodes that receive and respond to the HELLO message are the 1-hop 
neighbours of the sender node. Neighbour nodes know each other by exchanging HELLO messages, which reflect the 
local connectivity and are used to select the MPRs for routing connectivity [4].TC message list out the nodes that had 
made the sender as their MPR. Nodes maintain the topology based on HELLO and TC messages.  
1.2. Node Isolation Attack 
OLSR is vulnerable to many types of attacks [5]. Here we discuss about the node isolation attack that is capable 
to compromise OLSR protocol. It is a type of Denial of Service (DoS) attack. DoS attack is an attempt to make a 
machine or network resource unavailable to its intended users, such as to temporarily or indefinitely interrupt or 
suspend services of a host connected to the Internet [6]. In node isolation attack an attacker purposely isolates a victim 
node from the network. In this attack, the attacker exploits the fact that a node always prefers the minimal set of MPRs. 
In order to attack the victim the attacker will send a fake HELLO message to the attacker. This HELLO message 
claims that the sender node is in close proximity to all of the victim’s 2-hop neighbours. It also advertises a fictious 
node in order to attain the belief of victim. Therefore, according to the MPR selection rules the victim will appoint the 
attacker as its MPR. Then the attacker will not include the victim in its TC message. And this fraudulent MPR will 
not forward any messages from the victim to other nodes in the network. Thus the victim will get isolated in the 
network. In this paper, three methods are stated to prevent the node isolation attack in OLSR protocols. 
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2. Related Works 
2.1. Checking TC message 
In MANET, a node can hear transmissions from its MPR. By hearing the transmission of its MPR, a node can 
understand whether the MPR is malicious or not. The OLSR protocol follows a rule that each node in the network 
must broadcastHELLO message periodically. The broadcasting of HELLO message at intervals indicates the existence 
of a node in the network. This interval is called HELLO_INTERVAL [7]. Another rule in OLSR protocol is that the 
nodes which are employed as the MPR of other nodes in the network must broadcast TC messages periodically. The 
time interval for TC message broadcasting is called TC_INTERVAL [7]. TC message broadcasting will inform the 
link information to the selector node of TC message generator MPR. 
 
During node isolation attack, the attacker who is an MPR will not follow the rules of OLSR protocol accurately. 
The attacker MPR will generate and broadcast HELLO messages, but will not generate TC message; thereby isolating 
the node from rest of the network. TC message is the control message used to disseminate the topology information 
among all nodes in the network. Upon receiving TC messages of all MPR nodes in the network, each node learns all 
nodes’ MPR set and hence obtains knowledge of the whole network topology [7]. Then the nodes use the MPR set for 
communication. During node isolation attack, TC message is not generated by the attacker MPR. So that,other nodes 
cannot find the path to the victim node. Thus other nodes in the network will reach an assumption that the victim node 
has moved out from the network. So, those nodes will stop sending messages to the victim node. The victim node 
without knowing anything will continue messaging to other nodes in the network via its attacker MPR. The attacker 
MPR will not forward the victim’s message to other nodes. Thus the victim will be made completely isolated from 
rest of the entire network without its knowledge. 
 
As a node can hear its MPR’s transmission it can check for the TC messages generated by its MPR. The absence 
of the TC message from its MPR has to be checked thoroughly by a node. Absence of TC message indicates an 
anomaly. By checking the sequence number of TC message and HELLO message generated by the attacker MPR, the 
victim node can identify the anomaly. When there is no attack the TC message and HELLO message has been observed 
periodically. Sequence number for both HELLO message and TC message is there. When there is an attack, the 
HELLO message is periodic but the TC message is not periodic. The sequence number of TC message is not 
incrementing at the time of attack. In this way, if a node has detected that its MPR fails to generate TC message, a 
node can judge that its MPR is trying to isolate it [7]. Using this method a node can identify the source of attack. 
 
This is a simple method that can be used in MANET environment inorder to detect node isolation attack. However, 
one limitation of this approach is that it might not detect the attack which is launched by two consecutive nodes who 
work in collusion [7]. In this case it will be very difficult to detect the attack and therefore needs a new technique to 
detect and take countermeasure against the attack [7]. 
2.2. Using Additional Control Messages 
In this method, the node verifies the correctness of a HELLO message received from a 1-hop neighbour before 
designating it as MPR. In OLSR protocol, every node build its routing table and learn the network topology based on 
the HELLO and TC messages it receives from its neighbors [8].This method employs three more additional control 
messages along with HELLO message and TC message inorder to identify the malicious node. 
 
The three additional control messages are : 
 
x 2-hop request 
x 2-hop reply 
x Node Exist Query (NEQ) 
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Every node in the network maintains a table called ONE_HOP table [8].It stores the name of the HELLO message 
sender and the list of 2-hop neighbours of the receiving node mentioned in the HELLO message. Consider a network 
in which node A selects B, C and D nodes as its MPR set to reach its 2-hop neighbors E, F, G.Table 1 illustrates the 
ONE_HOP table of the node A. 
 
   Table 1. An example of a ONE_HOP table. 
HELLO message sender 2-hop neighbours 
of node A 
 
B E  
C F  
D G  
 
 
 
Suppose a new node X sends HELLO message advertising all the target node’s 2-hop neighbors as its 1-hop 
neighbours along with a new neighbour Z. Then node A will include X and Z in its ONE_HOP table. Then the node 
A will carry out its verification process. First, A will send the control message 2-hop request to its 2-hop neighbours 
E,F and G through its respective MPR set B, C and D. Fig 1 illustrates this process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1 Node A sends 2-hop request to E, F, G via B, C, D 
 
 
 
Upon receiving the 2-hop requests the 2-hop neighbours will send back the control message 2-hop reply to the 
node A as response. The 2-hop reply contains their ONE_HOP tables. Fig 2 illustrates this process. 
 
 
A C F H 
D 
B E 
G 
 
 
 
2-hop 
request 
2-hop request 
2-hop request 
2-hop 
request 
2-hop 
request 
2-hop 
request 
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Fig.2 E, F and G sending 2-hop reply to node A 
 
 
If X is present in all the 2-hop reply then node A will select X as its MPR. Otherwise, A will declare X as malicious 
node and include X in the malicious node list. Then it discards the HELLO message from X. It also informs the 
network that X is malicious through its HELLO message and TC message. All the other nodes getting this information 
will remove the routes that include X from their routing table.They also ignore the HELLO messages and TC messages 
coming from the malicious node X. 
 
If the node X is present in the coverage of E, F and G then the node A will send the control message NEQ through 
its current MPR set to find the existence of the node Z. If any of the MPR confirms the existence of Z then the node 
A will select X as its MPR. Otherwise, X will be confirmed as a malicious node. Thus the network can prevent node 
isolation attack. 
2.3. DCFN method 
Denial Contradictions with Fictious Node (DCFN) is a mechanism to prevent node isolation attack by using the 
same method used by the attacker [9]. DCFN employs a fictious node to pin-point the attacker node. In DCFN the 
integrity of HELLO message is checked by searching for contradictions in HELLO message with the known topology. 
Absence of contradiction is a criterion for MPR selection. DCFN assumes that the TC messages of the attacker will 
be legitimate [9]. The attacker will include the victim node’s name in its TC message. It is because; the victim’s 
control message will contain the attacker’s name. When checking both the messages, contradiction occurs if attacker’s 
TC message does not contain the victim. Thus everyone will identify the malicious node and will take preventive 
measures. 
 
DCFN use three contradiction rules: 
 
1. A victim must confirm that all nodes declared in the HELLO message of attacker must not 
be among the victim’s 1-hop neighbours 
2. For each node in the HELLO message, check  
x Existence of 1-hop neighbours not mentioned in HELLO message 
A C F H 
D 
B E 
G 
2-hop reply 
2-hop 
reply 
2-hop 
reply 
2-hop 
reply
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x Also, they are located at-least 3-hop away from victim 
x If above conditions are satisfied then check whether the attacker has appointed 
any other MPR to cover those nodes 
3. Victim must treat a HELLO message containing all the 1-hop neighbours as an attack 
 
First and second rules are used to identify the contradiction. Nodes that violate these two rules are treated as 
malicious. Third rule is used as a preventive measure. 
 
Fictious nodes are used in DCFN when an attacker somehow managed to satisfy the contradiction rules [9]. In such 
situations, a legitimate node (z) use fictious nodes (Fz) to prevent attack. Fz is not declared as fictious. So that all other 
nodes in the network believe that the fictious node is real. This implies that all nodes will have an entry for Fz in their 
routing tableand all routes from or to Fz must pass through z. Therefore, by the MPR selection rule z will be the MPR 
to Fz.Thus the attacker will be compelled to appoint z as its MPR. This can be verified as impossible through z’s TC 
message. Thus the attacker’s lie can be caught. 
 
3. Proposal of Digital Certificate Inclusion Technique to Avoid Node Isolation Attack in OLSR Protocol 
 
This paper mentions three methods to avoid node isolation attack. Introduction of other methods will enhance the 
avoidance of node isolation attack. Usage of cryptographic techniques is an advisable method for the detection of 
malicious nodes in the network. Digital certificate inclusionis a nice idea to strengthen the prevention of node isolation 
attack. This technique can be employed for authentication of nodes. Each node in the network must enforce a 
compulsory submission of digital certificatefrom the MPR candidates.Digital certificate contains the identifying 
information of a node. Digital certificates are issued by official trusted agencies. The issuing agency will include their 
digital signature within the digital certificate. So MPR candidates with digital certificates can be trusted.It also avoids 
non-repudiation.Non-repudiation refers to a state of affairs where the author of a statement will not be able to 
successfully challenge the authorship of the statement or validity of an associated contract [10]. Node isolation attack 
can be limited to an extent by assurance ofdigital certificate. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
MANET is a group of mobile devices that communicates wirelessly without any predefined infrastructure and 
centralized authority. OLSR is the most widely used routing protocol in MANET. But it is vulnerable to many kinds 
of attacks. This paper focuses on preventing node isolation attack; a type of Denial of Service (DoS) attack in OLSR 
protocol. We review three preventive measures in this paper. Checking TC message, usage of additional control 
messages and DCFN are the methods reviewed in this paper. Each measure depends on different methods to prevent 
node isolation attack. In the first method the attacker is identified by observing the absence of TC message from the 
attacker MPR. The attacker will avoid TC message generation in order to deny communication between the victim 
node and the rest of network. The sudden absence of the TC message will easily point out the attacker. In the second 
method, additional control messages are used in order to avoid the node isolation attack. 2-hop request, 2-hop reply 
and Node Exist Query (NEQ) are the additional control messages used in this method. This method also takes the help 
of a table called ONE_HOP table to prevent attack. The mismatch in the responses obtained from the additional control 
messages will help to identify the attacker. The DCFN method suggests three contradiction rules to avoid the attack. 
DCFN mechanism assumes that the attacker will broadcast TC message for sure. Else the attacker will be caught 
because of the absence of TC message. MPR candidates that do not follow the contradiction rule will be considered 
as malicious. DCFN also use a fictious node in order to identify attacker who was somehow able to follow the 
contradiction rules. All these three methods prevent node isolation attack in OLSR protocol. Along with the three 
methods, a suggestion to use authentication is presented in this paper. Each of the MPR candidates must submit a 
digital certificate from a trusted third party. The digital certificate will indicate the authenticity of a node in the 
network. So other nodes can select those MPR candidates without any suspicion.These are some of the ways used 
prevent node isolation attack in OLSR protocol. 
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